“Not Our War”—But Our Interests

Berlin’s political leadership is taking an overly simplistic approach. Instead of assessing the situation through the lens of national interests, it has opted for a blank rejection of any support. (Foto: Gerald Schneider)

Why the Strait of Hormuz matters far more to Germany than the current debate suggests

“This is not our war.”

With this line, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has justified Berlin’s reluctance to support the United States and Israel in their conflict with Iran. The phrase is politically effective. And yet, it is both accurate—and insufficient.

It is accurate in one key respect: the military strikes against Iran were carried out without meaningful consultation with European allies. Germany, like other EU member states, was neither involved in the decision-making nor in the operations themselves. The conflict was not initiated in pursuit of European interests.

But this is precisely where the argument begins to fall short.

The Illusion of Distance

Because it is equally true that the consequences of this war are already reaching Europe—economically, strategically, and potentially socially. Nowhere is this more visible than in the Strait of Hormuz.

The narrow waterway between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula remains one of the most critical chokepoints in the global economy. A significant share of the world’s traded oil and liquefied natural gas passes through it. Even minor disruptions have historically triggered immediate volatility in global energy markets.

At present, the situation is better described as one of heightened risk rather than a full-scale blockade: rising insurance premiums, rerouted shipments, temporary interruptions. But uncertainty alone is enough to unsettle markets.

For Germany—one of the world’s largest export-driven economies—this is not a peripheral issue. The free flow of trade is not just an abstract principle; it is a core national interest.

Global Ripple Effects

It is often noted that most energy shipments passing through the Strait of Hormuz are destined for Asia—India, China, Southeast Asia. That is correct. But it does not offer reassurance. On the contrary, it points to a global reallocation dynamic.

When Asian importers face disruptions, they turn to alternative suppliers. Europe, in turn, finds itself competing more directly for limited resources. The result is predictable: higher prices, first on wholesale markets, then across industries and ultimately for consumers.

The ripple effects extend beyond energy. Natural gas is a key input for fertilizer production. Disruptions in energy supply and transport can therefore cascade into agriculture—albeit with a time lag. Rising input costs, reduced yields, and increasing food prices are not speculative risks but plausible scenarios, as numerous international analyses have shown.

What emerges is not an isolated shock, but a textbook case of global interdependence: a regional conflict producing systemic consequences.

Interests Over Labels

Against this backdrop, the phrase “not our war” appears incomplete.It may describe the origin of the conflict—but not its impact.

Foreign policy in an interconnected world is not defined solely by responsibility, but by interests. And those interests are already at stake.

The real question, then, is not whether Germany should intervene militarily in a conflict it did not start. The question is whether—and how—it intends to safeguard its own strategic and economic interests.

Diplomacy Requires Presence

Diplomacy is often understood too narrowly—as a sequence of statements, negotiations, and public messaging. In reality, it encompasses a much broader set of tools.

Military capabilities, for instance, can serve as instruments of diplomatic signaling: as deterrence, as reassurance, as a contribution to stability—without necessarily implying direct involvement in combat.

Two scenarios illustrate this:

First: Germany possesses advanced mine countermeasure capabilities. Should the Strait of Hormuz be mined, these assets could be deployed as part of an international effort to secure maritime routes. Such a mission would be defensive in nature, politically justifiable, and operationally limited—while sending a clear signal of commitment to safeguarding global trade.

Second: A more sensitive option would involve escorting commercial vessels through the strait. Here, the line between protection and escalation becomes far less clear. Such a role would carry significantly higher risks of direct confrontation and political entanglement.

Between these poles lie additional options: logistical support, naval presence, or indirect contributions that relieve allied forces. The specific scenario matters less than the broader point: maintaining strategic flexibility.

Between Positioning and Strategy

Maintaining political distance from U.S. decisions may be justified—especially when those decisions are perceived as unilateral or unpredictable. A clear stance toward Washington can be necessary.

But positioning alone is not a strategy.

Regardless of how one assesses U.S. policy, its consequences affect Germany. A response limited to distancing risks overlooking the country’s own interests.

Conclusion

This is not about alignment.It is not about military activism.And it is not about symbolic defiance.

It is about interests.

And the central question is this:How does a country like Germany protect its interests in a world where economic stability, security, and geopolitics are inseparably linked?

“This is not our war” may be a compelling political message.As a framework for foreign policy, it is not enough.

This article also appreared on Substack.